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Abstract: Using the UK Independence Party (UKIP), we examine the effects of sudden 
electoral success on an Anti-Political Establishment (APE) party. The pressures of 
aspiring to government necessitate organisational structures resembling those of 
mainstream parties, while this aspiration challenges APE parties because they differ not 
just in terms of their policy profiles, but also in their more ‘unorthodox’ organisational 
make-up, inextricably linked to their electoral appeal. Robert Kilroy-Silk wanted to 
emphasise office-seeking goals while most members wanted the party to remain true to 
its APE status and not sacrifice its populist nature. This inevitably resulted in internal 
party conflict.  
 
 
Introduction 
Using the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a minor political 
party in the British party system, this article examines the effects of sudden electoral 
success on the organisational structures and long-term survival of a type of party that can 
be characterised as a right-wing populist Anti-Political Establishment (APE) party. On 
the one hand, the pressures of aspiring to or being in government pushes groups like this 
towards organisational structures resembling those of the mainstream parties. On the 
other hand, the shift to government aspiration represents severe challenges for APE 
parties because they tend to differ from their mainstream competitors not just in terms of 
their policy profiles, but also with regard to their more ‘unorthodox’ organisational make-
up, which is in turn inextricably linked to their populist self-understanding and electoral 
appeal. A closer examination of organisational peculiarities and specific challenges 
reveals that groups failing to adapt their structures are more likely to be unsuccessful in 
the attempt to establish themselves as viable and (potentially) governing parties.1  
Very little academic attention has been paid to UKIP, despite the fact that it 
achieved its biggest electoral success in the 2004 European Parliament election, winning 
over 16% of the British vote and electing 12 of its candidates (UKIP also elected two of 
its candidates to the London Assembly in 2004, although the candidates later defected to 
former television presenter Robert Kilroy-Silk’s ‘Veritas’, and by the end of 2005 
renamed themselves ‘One London’). UKIP’s European Parliament performance would 
appear to move it out of the ranks of ‘minor parties’, but we believe UKIP should still be 
considered a minor party due to its failure at the 2005 Westminster election, where the 
party won 2.2% of the vote and no seats, plus its poor performance at Scottish Parliament 
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(less than one per cent of the vote in 2007) and National Assembly for Wales (four per 
cent of the vote in 2007) elections. Indeed, UKIP has never seen any of its candidates 
elected as Members of Parliament (MPs) at Westminster,2 nor have any of its candidates 
been elected to the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly, despite the use of 
proportional electoral systems there. 
In spite of this minor party status, as well as the media circus resulting from the 
party’s leadership turmoil, UKIP is worthy of academic study. UKIP often condemns the 
European Union (EU) as a corrupt, elitist organisation and argues that the Conservative 
Party’s position on the EU differs little from that of the other main British parties. While 
the Conservatives appear lukewarm and perhaps ambivalent towards the EU, UKIP 
appeals to Eurosceptic voters with a clear-cut policy: British withdrawal from the EU 
altogether. The selection of a high-profile candidate, Kilroy-Silk, to help promote this 
message may have helped UKIP achieve great electoral success in the 2004 European 
Parliament election, but the fallout resulting from his departure from the party was not 
helpful to UKIP’s public image. We argue that because UKIP’s leadership selection 
process favours intraparty democracy, the process simply could not adapt to the 
circumstances of sudden electoral success and the rise of a charismatic television 
personality, with an ambitious agenda for the party, as a potential leader. UKIP requires a 
one member/one vote election for its leaders, and members have a great deal of influence 
over the party’s policies. The appearance of an outspoken celebrity who wanted to 
challenge the Conservative Party’s claim to being the natural choice for Eurosceptic 
voters was too much for UKIP to handle.  
 3
  One might claim that UKIP’s success had a lot to do with the fact that European 
Parliament elections are very much second-order elections3 conducted under proportional 
rules, and that such circumstances invite an anti-EU protest; it is highly unlikely that 
UKIP will ever be in the position to govern with (presumably) the Conservatives at 
Westminster, thanks to the single-member plurality system used for British parliamentary 
elections. We argue that in addition to these electoral barriers to UKIP’s potential for 
success, there are significant organisational factors that doom the party to failure. There 
is an inherent contradiction between wanting to be a populist APE party, organised in a 
‘grassroots’ democratic way, and wanting to achieve significant electoral success at some 
point. While other UK parties have begun to adopt practices like one member/one vote 
for party leader, UKIP has among the most highly developed intraparty democratic 
procedures. Thus, UKIP is ‘doomed to fail’ as long as it is unable, or unwilling, to deal 
with this contradiction.  
A party’s organisational structure evolves over time, and the position of important 
events in a party’s life cycle has major implications for how well the party organisation 
can handle such events. In the case of UKIP after its European Parliament success, there 
was a ‘timing problem’ – Kilroy-Silk arrived too early in UKIP’s life cycle. A chronicler 
of UKIP’s experiences, Mark Daniel, alludes to the party’s desire to maintain its peculiar 
organisational form, rather than focus on vote-maximisation and office-seeking goals, 
arguing ‘that such problems – the reconciliation of pure democratic principle with the 
desire to construct a structured political party which could function among professional 
rivals, the desperate need for funding, the casting about for kindred spirits and allies, the 
attempt to remain idealistic while winning and holding temporal power, the desire for 
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stable leaders, coupled with an aspiration to popular leadership – are inevitable at the 
birth of any political party founded upon conviction and by amateurs in the modern 
world’.4 We will explore Daniel’s argument in a systematic and theoretical way in this 
article.   
     
UKIP as an Anti-Political Establishment Party 
A party can be classified as an APE party if it fulfils all of the following criteria:5 
? A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political 
system issues. 
? A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the 
political establishment. 
? A party that asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political 
establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment parties, be 
they in government or in opposition, are essentially the same. 
The last criterion in particular captures a central element in most definitions of 
populism.6 As Canovan has pointed out populist movements on both the right and left of 
the political spectrum assert that ‘the people’ have been excluded from power by ‘corrupt 
politicians and an unrepresentative elite’ who without fail disregard the interests and 
opinions of ordinary voters.7 Thus, populist APE parties, in contrast to, for example, 
communist or fascist APE parties, generally emphasize the need for the party to be 
organized in a grassroots democratic way. Moreover, they demand that the electorate be 
more directly involved in decision-making, through the introduction of direct democracy 
into the political process.      
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UKIP certainly challenges the status quo, particularly on one major policy issue: 
British membership of the EU. While not the only British political party that advocates 
EU withdrawal – the extreme-right British National Party (BNP) also espouses this policy 
– even the Eurosceptic Conservative Party does not go so far as to call for leaving the 
organisation. UKIP’s party constitution8 states at the outset, in Article 2, that ‘to 
withdraw the UK from the European Union’, in order that the UK ‘shall again be 
governed by laws made to suit its own needs by its own Parliament, which must be 
directly and solely accountable to the electorate of the UK’ is its ‘principal aim’.  
In addition to challenging a major policy issue, UKIP’s advocacy of EU 
withdrawal would bring about a significant change in the British political system. Most 
contemporary accounts of the British constitution recognise that the traditional 
‘Westminster model’ of democracy, in which power is highly concentrated at the centre 
(justified by ‘parliamentary sovereignty’), was altered fundamentally when Britain joined 
what was then called the European Economic Community in 1973; together with the 
subsequent devolution of power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, Britain 
experiences what is now called ‘multilevel governance’, in which power is much more 
dispersed, despite what politicians might claim.9 While even most textbooks on British 
politics now describe how EU membership and UK territorial devolution of power 
undermine parliamentary sovereignty, and that multilevel governance is a reality, UKIP 
seems to want to turn the clock back. In addition to advocating EU withdrawal, UKIP, in 
recent election manifestos,10 calls for abolition of the Welsh Assembly and the 
replacement of the 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament with the 59 ‘underemployed’ 
Scottish (Westminster) MPs. Other changes the party seeks include ‘English days’ in 
 6
Parliament in which only English MPs will be able to debate bills that apply only to 
England, the scrapping of all English regional assemblies, and the repeal of the Human 
Rights Act. Therefore, UKIP stands firmly against the status quo on major policy issues 
that have significant implications for the British political system as a whole. 
In addition to this challenge to the system, UKIP seems to relish its role as a 
challenger to the established political parties in Britain. The current leader of UKIP, 
Nigel Farage, invoked this status for his party upon assuming the leadership in September 
2006. ‘We’re going to be a party fighting on a broad range of domestic policies and 
together if we’re united and disciplined we will become the real voice of opposition in 
British politics’, Farage said, adding that ‘David Cameron clearly has decided to abandon 
Conservatism’.11 The Conservatives, for their part, have referred to UKIP as a collection 
of ‘cranks and gadflies’,12 trying to marginalise the upstart party. Even Conservatives 
sympathetic to UKIP’s call for EU withdrawal, such as the MP Philip Davies, argue that 
the party would be better off as a pressure group and question why UKIP has tried to 
‘rebrand’ itself as a party interested in more than just a single issue.13 In 2006, relations 
between the two right-wing parties reached a new low when Conservative leader David 
Cameron told the listeners of a radio phone-in show that UKIP was full of ‘fruitcakes and 
loonies – and closet racists mostly’, a comment that elicited the threat of a libel suit from 
Farage.14  
 UKIP constantly invokes populist appeals to show how it stands up for ‘the 
people’s’ interests while the other parties support the same old status quo. For example, 
UKIP’s 2005 UK election manifesto and 2007 Scottish and Welsh election manifestos all 
called for a strengthening of local democracy, as well as referendums at both the local 
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and UK level where there is support (displayed by means of petition signatures). This 
populist policy is at odds with the traditional Westminster model that concentrates power 
in the hands of the Cabinet, yet is consistent with UKIP’s anti-politician message. 
Populism also reveals itself in comments from UKIP members, particularly when they 
claim that the main parties are essentially the same. UKIP leader Farage claimed that ‘on 
the big issues of the day you cannot put a cigarette paper between the three major parties’ 
and that while some people ‘may place us as being right of centre, I would place us as 
being in the centre of public opinion’.15 The previous leader, Roger Knapman, wrote in 
his introduction to UKIP’s 2005 general election manifesto that members of his party do 
not see themselves as politicians; they ‘are people from all backgrounds who feel deeply 
what the majority of British people feel – that it is not right to have our country run by 
institutions across the Channel’ and that a ‘vote for any other party will be a wasted vote 
– it will merely continue our subservience to Brussels’. The manifesto later describes the 
EU as ‘undemocratic, corrupt, and unreformable’. Statements like these imply a division 
between UKIP, which represents ‘average’ British people, and the ‘professional’ 
politicians of the major parties who have allowed, and continue to allow, Britain to be run 
by a corrupt foreign organisation.  
 While some observers might want to categorise UKIP as a party of the extreme 
right, we reject this classification. There are many different scholarly definitions of what 
characterises parties of the extreme right, with no agreement on one precise definition.16 
Cas Mudde’s search through the relevant literature revealed these five common 
characteristics among the majority of the scholarship: ‘nationalism, racism, xenophobia, 
anti-democracy, and the strong state’.17 In another review of the literature on the extreme 
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right, Roger Eatwell points to a similar list of characteristics that ‘figure most 
prominently in academic definitions…hostility to democracy; racism; support for the 
strong state; and nationalism’.18 Some definitions of the extreme right get entangled with 
definitions of other right-wing parties, such as right-wing populist parties,19 but as 
pointed out earlier, we consider populist parties to be a distinct subtype of the APE party. 
The classification of UKIP as an APE party should help to clarify how the party fits into 
the British party system. 
 
Organisation and Life Cycles 
Because of their outsider status and declared opposition to the mainstream parties, APE 
parties can be expected to focus on policy-seeking, intraparty democracy-seeking and 
vote-seeking goals.20 As long as their anti-establishment stances have electoral appeal, 
these parties are not likely to sacrifice their anti-establishment objectives. Thus, why 
would APE parties change their priorities in the first place? A shift in primary goals 
could be triggered, gradually or abruptly, by internal factors or external stimuli. Harmel 
and Janda’s ‘discrete change’ approach21 suggests that change may be induced by the 
replacement of a party’s leadership or dominant faction alone, but that external shocks 
usually have a stronger and more direct impact. The objective sought by a party 
determines the kinds of external stimuli that will be most conducive to change. For a 
vote-seeking party this may be a string of disappointing election results.22 While shifts in 
the nature of the party system or instances of poor electoral performance are particularly 
important for most parties, a new APE party’s change of primary goals is more likely to 
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be induced by an unexpectedly successful electoral performance that gives it a pivotal 
role. Under such circumstances, office-seeking goals may eventually come to the fore.   
While external shocks often lead parties to reassess their primary goals, this 
change, in turn, encourages them to undertake organisational reforms. The role and 
interdependence of external stimuli and internal factors in explaining such reforms has 
been substantiated both for right-wing populist and for green APE parties.23 But why 
should office-seeking APE parties be expected to change in the direction of conformity 
with their mainstream competitors? After all, parties tend to be conservative with regard 
to their structures, and APE parties do not just display opposition to the policy and issue 
positions of the political establishment, but also a distinct organisational make-up, which 
tends to be part and parcel of their very anti-establishment platforms, to correspond to the 
expectations of their members and supporters, and hence to be in line with their policy-
seeking, intraparty democracy-seeking and vote-seeking goals. As long as APE parties 
are not office-seeking, but capitalise on anti-party sentiment in attracting and binding 
voters, they can thus be expected to retain their characteristic ‘movement’ character and 
to resist pressures to adapt.24 
 An answer to the question raised here is suggested by the ‘life-cycle’ approach. 
Building on Michels25 and Stein,26 its proponents argue that there is a nexus between a 
party’s stage of development and its primary goals, on the one hand, and specific 
leadership tasks and organisational requirements, on the other.27 Change occurs gradually 
as parties move through three stages of development, and the nature and timing of 
organisational reforms is a function of an ‘individual party’s age and/or growth 
pattern’.28 Each of the phases that a party goes through on its way to maturation not only 
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requires specific leadership abilities, strategic orientations and capacity, but also 
appropriate organisational resources. As their structures develop, parties shed their initial 
‘movement’ character, formulate a broader and long-term political agenda, and enter a 
path of institutionalisation. 
At the first stage, which stretches from a party’s formation to the election of its 
first couple of representatives, it must develop and communicate its identity and message, 
and secure a constituency. An APE party will be particularly eager to achieve these 
objectives by distinguishing itself from its competitors. Policy-seeking and intraparty 
democracy-seeking goals are likely to be prioritised. The greater opportunities for 
meaningful involvement that any new party, especially an APE party, tends to afford may 
attract members and supporters as much as its issue positions. ‘Novice ideologues’ with 
high levels of ideological commitment and loyalty to the leadership, but little or no 
office-holding experience are likely to play an important role.29  
Their distinctive organisational structures make APE parties more open and 
attractive to this kind of members and conversely, these groups will initially have a 
strong incentive not to question their ‘unorthodox’ features or to deter ‘novice 
ideologues’. Especially where they are founded and guided through the first phase of 
their existence by a charismatic leader with the requisite creative abilities and rhetorical 
qualities, a differentiated and effective organisation will not be greatly missed. Instead, 
the leader will draw on his/her personal authority and a small cadre of activists in order to 
compensate for the lack of established rules and procedures.30 The typical dearth of 
members that are experienced and ‘presentable’ enough to fill responsible intraparty 
positions or to run as candidates exacerbates the tendency of right-wing populist APE 
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party leaders to manage their formations in a hierarchical fashion, only supported by a 
small inner circle that monopolises key positions. More often than not, party decision-
making bodies are nonexistent or subordinate, and there is little role differentiation.31  
In short, the maximum visibility and freedom of action enjoyed by the leader can 
be conducive to a new party’s development and success at this stage. In the case of UKIP, 
the founder and first leader (1993-7), Alan Sked, exercised a significant amount of 
personal control over his party. In 1992, in order to oppose the Maastricht Treaty, Sked 
founded the Anti-Federalist League and decided to contest a number of seats in that 
year’s general election. While all of the League’s candidates fared rather poorly in the 
election, Sked, who himself had run against Chris Patten, managed to gain some media 
attention.32 In 1993, together with a few supporters, he launched the United Kingdom 
Independence Party, which unlike the Anti-Federalist League was to be a full-fledged 
political party.33 Daniel argues that Sked drafted a constitution that gave ‘undue security 
to the leader’.34 He points out that such power in the hands of a leader had its drawbacks 
because Sked ‘was an inspirational leader and a brilliant man, but he refused to believe 
that anyone had skills other than his own or that, if they had, they might be of value. He 
could not delegate. Everything was always about Alan, and all decisions must be referred 
to him. He was certainly no administrator, and, as soon as this was pointed out he flew 
into a fury’.35 
At the second stage in a party’s life cycle, vote-seeking goals come to the fore, 
and a party’s soaring number of rank-and-file members, parliamentary representatives 
and office-holders creates new challenges. It can no longer be run as a one-man (or one-
woman) show, responsibilities have to be delegated, and routinised mechanisms of 
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conflict resolution and consensus building have to be established in order to deal with 
increased levels of intraparty factionalism. More effective campaign management is 
required, too, in order to make electoral success more durable. All these challenges 
require activists with more political experience and administrative skills than the ‘novice 
ideologues’. In short, this second phase is likely to be characterised by major 
organisational reforms. In order to ensure their successful implementation, the party 
leadership has to become less personalised, giving up some control. If the original leader 
does not possess the organisational skills and strategic foresight necessary to steer the 
party through the second (or any other) developmental stage, a change in the party’s 
leadership might occur; leadership change can either facilitate a party’s move to the next 
phase or, if it is associated with vicious infighting, tear it apart and ultimately lead to its 
demise. 
Right-wing populist APE parties are faced with a particular dilemma in this regard 
– they highlight themes of grassroots democracy and popular sovereignty. These themes 
play an important role in attracting and binding members and supporters. At the same 
time, the success of these parties strongly depends on the personality and skills of their 
leaders. Thus, democracy-seeking goals are much more part of their populist rhetoric than 
of their actual behaviour. There is no obvious way out of the tension between populist 
stances and a highly centralised organisational reality. This is likely to create 
disappointment and massive internal strife. 
As UKIP gained members in the mid-1990s, the party began to restructure itself in 
a more democratic way,36 but these changes were accompanied by significant infighting 
until a measure of stability emerged early in the next decade. Sked, who resigned the 
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leadership in July 1997, was seen as ‘a “control-freak” who lost control but could not 
acknowledge it’ by Daniel,37 who recounts Sked’s troubles with competition from Sir 
James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, an attempted BNP infiltration, and sniping from 
other senior party members.38 The new leader, Michael Holmes, was also seen by party 
colleagues as an egotistical control freak who feared any threats to his position.39 He lost 
the confidence of the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) soon after the party 
won three seats in the 1999 European Parliament election; he and the entire NEC 
resigned.40 Eventually, however, UKIP entered a period of stability under new leaders, 
and in 2004 the party claimed nearly 20,000 members.41 Membership figures remained 
fairly stable, with UKIP reporting to the Electoral Commission that it had about 16,700 
members in June 2007.42 
Finally, the third stage sets in when the party’s attention shifts to office-seeking 
goals, and its government aspiration is noticed and taken seriously by others. At that 
point it must put emphasis on establishing and solidifying its reputation as a potential 
party of government, and hence will have to tone down its criticism of competitors. 
Relationships with other parties must be developed and cultivated. Erratic leadership 
behaviour or unresolved internal conflict is no longer tolerable because it jeopardises 
attempts to secure credibility. A leader now has to have the abilities of a ‘moderator and 
stabiliser’,43 administrative and human-relations skills, and a much greater degree of 
strategic capacity in order to master a nested, or two-level, game: an internal game with 
rank-and-file members and middle-level activists, and an external one with other 
(established) parties.44 In order to achieve these objectives, existing organisational 
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structures must be fine-tuned, and the requirements of successful government 
participation are likely to necessitate centralisation.  
Yet the ‘popular movement’ character of right-wing populist APE parties tends to 
be more pronounced and more crucial to their electoral appeal than is the case for right-
wing extremist APE parties. Institutionalisation is therefore a major challenge for right-
wing populist APE parties, especially office-seeking ones. The populist aspects of these 
parties enable them to be credible opposition forces and to make electoral gains.  As soon 
as they prioritise office-seeking goals, however, these strengths are likely to turn into 
disadvantages, and the failure to solve organisational problems jeopardises long-term 
survival. Moreover, while they greatly depend on their leader's skills, the leader 
him/herself is, in many cases, a political neophyte and hence inexperienced in the 
business of managing a party. Stabilising the party and making it fit for government 
participation requires the leader to give up some of his/her power, to delegate 
responsibilities, and to accept some factionalism.45 
Various organisational dimensions are implied in the life-cycle heuristic: the 
degree of territorial and functional differentiation, and of (de)centralisation in internal 
decision-making; forms of leadership and its selection; the existence and nature of 
procedures and norms that regulate the relationship between the leadership, middle-level 
activists and rank-and-file members; the existence and nature of links with social 
movements; etc. Institutionalisation can thus be defined as a process of organisational 
change whereby a party acquires a degree of autonomy and clearly demarcated 
boundaries. Other features include a proper balance of internal coherence and 
differentiation, with a firmly established division of labour among party members and 
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bodies; clearly defined rules that regulate access to intraparty positions and guide the 
behaviour of members; procedures of rule enforcement; and mechanisms that enable 
organisational adaptation and learning.46  
 
Robert Kilroy-Silk and UKIP’s Life Cycle ‘Mismatch’ 
Empirically, life-cycle stages, primary goals, organisational resources and structures may 
or may not coincide, but a party’s successful institutionalisation and long-term survival 
appear to be strongly dependent on such a ‘match’. Hence even APE parties should be 
expected to change their structures in the direction of conformity when they start 
prioritising office-seeking goals – parties that fail to adapt in this way are unlikely to 
develop the strategic capacity needed to become part of the political establishment, and to 
ensure their long-term survival. Yet this very organisational adaptation is likely to be a 
huge and often insurmountable challenge for APE parties. Success is by no means 
guaranteed, and efforts to change structures may precipitate the demise of this party type 
both where they fail and where they are implemented too quickly, or lead too far. The 
scope of change necessary to meet systemic pressures and the requirements of eventual 
government participation is much greater for these groups than the pressures faced by 
their mainstream competitors precisely because their ‘movement’ character, peculiar 
leadership style and ‘unorthodox’ organisational make-up are interwoven with their core 
message. A change in this dimension represents no less than a shift away from their very 
raison d’être. The reassessment of primary goals and organisational reforms following it 
are very likely to open up a large credibility gap, sparking factional conflict.  
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Unlike their mainstream competitors, office-seeking APE parties face the 
dilemma of maintaining their radical opposition identity and challenger appeal while at 
the same time transforming their structures in order to enhance the effectiveness of their 
parliamentary and governmental work. These reforms can be expected to drive a wedge 
between supporters, rank-and-file members and middle-level activists who are mainly 
ideologically motivated and want to preserve their party’s challenger status and those – 
usually the inner circle – who favour an office-seeking strategy. An ambitious office-
seeking strategy is exactly what Kilroy-Silk wanted UKIP to pursue in the wake of the 
spectacular 2004 European Parliament election result, both for the party and for himself 
personally.  
Robert Kilroy-Silk, a former Labour MP and television personality who had just 
been sacked by the BBC for making anti-Arab remarks, was a consistent opponent of the 
European Community/Union.47 This determined man seemed to be a perfect fit for UKIP 
given his fight against political correctness and the political establishment. The two 
quickly found common ground and Kilroy-Silk was placed at the top of the party’s list in 
the East Midlands.48 Due to his celebrity status and higher name recognition, Kilroy-Silk 
soon became the face of UKIP’s European Parliament election campaign. The election 
was a triumph for the party. It gained 16.1% of the votes and emerged as the third largest 
party ahead of the Liberal Democrats and just ten points behind the Conservatives. 
Kilroy-Silk felt that this provided the party with a perfect opening to adopt a more 
ambitious strategy. He sought to take on the Conservatives, a party that should be 
‘killed’, in his words; however, such a killing was not what UKIP wanted.49 The party 
would not target Eurosceptic MPs, and Kilroy-Silk’s announcement to the contrary 
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alienated Paul Sykes, a major donor who later withdrew support for UKIP because of 
Kilroy-Silk’s comments.50  
Kilroy-Silk’s personal ambition was to replace Knapman as leader. In a television 
interview, Kilroy-Silk told David Frost that ‘everybody tells me they want…the current 
leader to accept the inevitable and to stand down…during the last June elections, the 
current leader told me and others that he would step down after the election – but then of 
course he got a massive election result and…now he’s changed his mind’.51 From the 
life-cycle perspective, this turn of events reveals a mismatch between a party that was 
still in the second stage of its life cycle and a quasi-leader who behaved like it was 
already in the third stage, due to its sudden electoral success. Furthermore, UKIP’s highly 
democratic organisational structure required that party members vote upon any change in 
leadership in a one member/one vote postal ballot. Knapman, responding to Kilroy-Silk’s 
televised claim, pointed out to friends that such an arrangement would be 
unconstitutional: ‘Not only would I not make any such agreement, but I could not!’.52 
The leader later announced in a radio interview that ‘there could be no straight handover’ 
due to the party’s constitutional requirements, and that Kilroy-Silk ‘must start to think 
about being a team player’.53 Kilroy-Silk resigned the party whip shortly afterwards and 
formed his own party, Veritas. 
While mainstream parties can draw on an organisational continuity that implies 
‘some capitulation to the requirements of competition and pluralism’,54 APE parties often 
do not have effective intraparty decision-making bodies and procedures. Hence they can 
easily be torn apart by internal conflict. Furthermore, membership dues are important 
resources for newer and smaller parties, and government aspirations may attract a great 
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number of new members expecting policy rewards or party and public offices for 
themselves. Yet a quickly growing number of members may be a double-edged sword for 
APE parties because they are likely to attract more ‘novice ideologues’ than persons with 
the required political skills, and hence to exacerbate the described internal conflict, which 
will often take the form of a rift between ‘ideologues’ and ‘careerists’, or between the 
leadership and rank-and-file members.  
These dangers are likely to be compounded if office-seeking goals are envisaged 
at the early stages of an APE party’s development, when its degree of institutionalisation 
is still low, or when the stages of development occur simultaneously. While mainstream 
parties can adapt to environmental change in a gradual fashion precisely because they 
‘have been around for a while’, such a sequential and evolutionary path is generally not 
available to APE parties that decide to embark on an office-seeking strategy when they 
get the unexpected chance to join a government. Instead, they usually have to adapt rather 
quickly, which puts additional stress on their leadership and makes failure more likely. 
Evidence gathered by Harmel and Svåsand not only supports the argument that different 
stages in an APE party’s life cycle require a leadership with different, task-appropriate 
skill sets. It also shows that these parties are more likely to fail in achieving 
institutionalisation and securing long-term survival if they have major electoral success 
and become potential governing parties too quickly after their foundation, at a moment of 
organisational immaturity. Inadequate leadership skills and misguided strategic 
orientations may result in turmoil and the premature demise of new formations under 
those circumstances.55 Thus, sustainable organisational change is more likely to occur in 
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those office-seeking APE parties that have reached the final stage of their development 
before they decide to make government participation their main goal. 
Kilroy-Silk’s failure to become party leader and his subsequent departure 
consequently may ultimately turn out to be a blessing for UKIP. As a result of the party’s 
return to an emphasis on policy and intraparty democracy-seeking goals, a match 
between UKIP’s organisational structure and its life-cycle stage is once again in 
evidence. While this will not necessarily help the party in electoral terms, it will enable 
UKIP to establish itself as a fairly stable minor party in the British party system. There is 
also still the possibility that UKIP may eventually move into the third stage of party 
development assuming that it has sufficient time gradually to make the necessary 
organisational changes.  
Where does UKIP stand now? Despite its attempts to build upon its 2004 
European Parliament electoral success, the party has failed to attract significant support. 
Not wishing to be seen as a single-issue party, UKIP has broadened out its policy agenda, 
concentrating heavily on immigration (where it seeks a major reduction), the economy 
(calling for less regulation, lower taxes, and ‘freer’ trade policies), and devolution of 
power (which it opposes). This approach, in theory, should help the party, since recent 
opinion polling indicates that Europe, as a single issue, is only seen as the most 
important, or another important, issue facing Britain by four per cent of those surveyed.56 
Immigration and race relations, on the other hand, are rated as important by 43% of those 
polled by Ipsos MORI in late 2007, ahead of crime (at 41%) with the highest level of 
support. On voting intentions, the same poll found that Europe was a very important issue 
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in the next general election to only 11% of those surveyed, while crime was at the top 
(56%), ahead of health care (47%) and immigration (46%). 
 Perhaps because mainstream parties have policies on these issues, and because 
both Labour and the Conservatives have rather Eurosceptic positions (with only the 
Liberal Democrats being consistently pro-EU), UKIP does not fare well in recent polling. 
Both Ipsos MORI and ICM polling in September and October 2007 found that UKIP had 
the support of one per cent of those surveyed, behind the Greens. UKIP has also 
experienced trouble in attracting donations, with support down to £184,122 in 2007 from 
£271,807 in 2006, according to the party’s financial statement filed with the Electoral 
Commission,57 which also indicates that the party’s total income dropped from £676,952 
in 2005 to £435,827 in 2006. Perhaps most importantly, however, on the crucial issue of 
whether Britain should remain in the EU, 56% of those polled by ICM in October 2007 
said Britain should stay, while 38% said Britain should leave.58 While the number 
supporting withdrawal is considerable, the majority of British people appear to disagree 
with UKIP’s most important policy. If a party is identified very strongly with one major 
issue, and most people disagree with its position on this issue, then it is clearly going to 
be difficult for the party to gain a major following. 
 
Conclusion 
In choosing UKIP for this article, we hope not only to have contributed to the scholarly 
study of minor parties by looking at how UKIP’s organisational structure offers the party 
opportunities (and dangers), but by classifying UKIP as an APE party, rather than an 
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extreme right or single-issue party, we also hope we have enhanced the conventional 
understanding of the British party system.  
Shortly after its spectacular success in the 2004 European Parliament election, 
UKIP faced a crucial challenge to its status as a populist APE party: a celebrity with great 
ambitions for the party (and himself) appeared too early in UKIP’s life cycle. The party 
rejected not only his supposed entitlement to the leadership (which could not be granted 
by anyone but the party’s membership in a postal ballot), but also his claims that UKIP 
could ‘kill’ the Conservatives because of UKIP’s position on the EU. The party seemed 
to view itself as having enough of a ‘movement’ character to resist the temptation to take 
on Conservative candidates at large, rather than just those individuals who were 
perceived as ‘weak’ on Europe. Rather than becoming a replacement for the 
Conservatives, UKIP chose to remain true to its APE status and not sacrifice its populist 
nature. 
UKIP’s decision to refrain from taking on the Conservatives wholeheartedly 
reflects its position in the second stage of its life cycle. Being at this stage means that 
UKIP retains some characteristics of a popular movement and, as such, is less of a direct 
electoral threat to the Conservatives. UKIP can function almost like a pressure group, 
however, and possibly have some impact on Conservative Party policy. Furthermore, the 
presence of UKIP could act as something of a safety valve for the Conservatives: a place 
for disaffected party members (and possibly even politicians) to go. In this sense, the two 
parties are not necessarily enemies and can exist almost symbiotically.  
Daniel’s historical narrative on UKIP points out the many problems facing a 
‘party founded upon conviction and by amateurs in the modern world’.59 We have tried 
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to elaborate upon these points in a systematic and theoretical way in this article, 
explaining UKIP’s fundamental problems arising from its peculiar form of organisation 
and the implications of its stage in the life cycle, rather than relying on the standard 
criticism of the party as hobbled by its electoral context. Obviously the party’s over-
reliance upon a position that is not shared by the majority of British people does not help 
its chances, and UKIP’s place at the bottom of current opinion polling does not bode well 
for its future. The electoral context, however, could change, particularly as the 2009 
European Parliament election approaches. We argue that until the party reaches the 
appropriate stage in its life cycle, UKIP will find it impossible to take full advantage of 
any good electoral fortune that might come its way. 
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